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ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to reconcile culture with a theory of 
rational choice. First, an examination of Mayan and Miskito 
Indian cultures is given with reference to Craig Jackson 
Calhoun's argument that traditional communities are more 
readily mobilized into collective action than non- 
traditional communities. Second, an overview of the 
"political" and "moral" economy approaches to rationality 
illustrates why these frameworks are incapable of explaining 
the Miskito and Mayan Indian behaviors examined in part one. 
Finally, the evaluation exposes the need to develop a third, 
"culturally inclusive" explanation of rational behavior that 
is capable of accounting for distinctive sociocultural 
factors functioning within a given community. A cross- 
cultural and transnational model of rational choice should 
not consider rationality as static or monomorphic, but 
instead, as relative to the social system at hand. The 
paper concludes by offering the foundation for a theoretical 
approach to rational choice that avoids the pitfall of 
cultural universalism, instead considering rationality as 
relative.
HOW CULTURE SHAPES RATIONALITY: 
STUDY OF MAYAN AND MISKITO COMMUNITIES 
IN GUATEMALA AND NICARAGUA
Introduction
Peasants make up almost 35 percent of the world's 
population and live in nearly all of the world's nations.1 
It would seem, therefore, that peasant behavior —  social, 
economic and political —  should be considered a meaningful 
and influential area of investigation for all fields of 
social science, academic and policy-oriented alike. The 
many attempts and failures at "democratization" during the 
past fifteen years2 have demonstrated the importance of 
addressing the ambitions and rationalities of the peoples 
and communities that constitute a substantial and vital 
portion of the world's inhabits —  the peasants.3
North American involvement in the Korean and Vietnam 
Wars brought about unprecedented interest among social
1 See Eric R. Wolf, Peasants (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1966), pp. 1-17.
2Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late 
Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 
3-31, 280-315.
Anthropologists and other social scientists interested in 
"peasant studies" have manufactured quite an extensive debate on 
the meaning of the word "peasant" and who qualifies to be labeled 
as such. This paper does not tap into that polemic. For the 
purpose of arguments here, I define peasants as individuals with 
little or no formal education, who participate in subsistence 
agriculture, primarily as laborers and occasionally as petty 
landowners.
2
3scientists in addressing peasant behavior in order to better 
understand the "enemy” and his motivation in opposing U.S. 
Democracy. Within political science, this interest 
developed into a debate over the explanatory power of 
"political” and "moral" economists, perhaps best represented 
by authors Samuel Popkin and James Scott, respectively.
In his influential book, The Moral Economy of the 
Peasant. Scott has argued that peasants plan their lives to 
be "risk free" by striving only to maintain rudimentary 
subsistence levels rather than to raise their incomes and 
improve living standards. Conversely, in The Political 
Economy of the Peasant. Samuel Popkin has asserted that 
peasants indeed do take risks, venturing to improve living 
standards and raise subsistence levels through both long- 
and short-term investments.
In this thesis paper I have chosen not to take the 
tempting "middle ground" between the two theorists by 
attempting to converge their ideas into a single, more 
comprehensive view of peasant behavior. Instead, I propose 
using the authors' debate —  and specifically Popkin's 
intervention —  as a point of departure into an area I find 
both crucial to understanding peasant motivation in 
collective action and relatively unexplored by political 
scientists: the role of culture in determining political 
behavior within peasant communities.
Whereas Popkin has argued that economic factors are the 
force driving peasant behavior, I will argue that commitment
4to traditional culture within certain peasant communities is 
equally important —  and in fact more influential —  in 
determining both individual and collective behavior. It is 
not my intention to oppose Popkin's theory entirely, because 
I believe that peasants are indeed rational actors. I 
argue, however, that understanding peasant behavior is not 
an easily generalizable task, as Popkin implies, but a 
complex one which must account for specific cultural 
influences functioning within individual communities. I 
attempt to show, then, that rationality is not "given for 
all time, but endogenous to the social system at hand."4
This paper is an attempt to reconcile cultural and 
traditional influences with a model of rational behavior 
determined at the individual level. I argue that by 
eliminating cultural influences and relying solely on 
"economic rationality" or economic self-interest, as Popkin 
has done, we cannot provide an adequate explanation of 
traditional peasant behavior. Only by accepting that 
rationality is influenced and constrained by sociocultural 
determinants, in addition to economic ones, can we begin to 
develop a cross-cultural model of rational behavior.
In his article, "The Radicalism of Tradition and the 
Question of Class Struggle,"5 Craig Jackson Calhoun argues
4Andrew Levine and Erik Olin Wright, "Rationality and Class 
Struggle," New Left Review 123 (1980): 47-68.
5Craig Jackson Calhoun, "The Radicalism of Tradition and the 
Question of Class Struggle," in Rationality and Revolution, ed. 
Michael Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp.
in support of theoretical stance that I believe makes room 
for the analysis of sociocultural factors in doctrines of 
rational choice. Calhoun closely follows the earlier work 
of Ian Lustik, who asserted: "there is a pre-existing sense 
of community among participants in collective revolutionary 
action that makes it possible for organizers [both insiders 
and outsiders] to appeal to the rationality of their 
constituents as a basis for participation."6 " [A] strongly 
knit social network," Calhoun adds, is "characteristic of 
traditional communities and helps to explain their ability 
to mobilize directly, instead of through the formal 
organizations so important to the modern working class."7
In Chapter I of this paper, I discuss the four reasons 
why —  in Calhoun's view —  direct mobilization is easier 
for traditional than for non-traditional communities. For 
Calhoun, (1) the ability to identify common enemies, (2) a 
tendency to be easily disrupted by outside intervention (3) 
communal control of social life, and (4) "ideological unity" 
serve to facilitate collective action within peasant 
communities. I proceed by examining a variety of empirical 
evidence (from Indian testimonials, anthropological case 
studies, and social science fieldwork) in order to 
demonstrate how Calhoun's framework might be
129-75.
6Ian S. Lustik, "Writing the Intifada," World Politics 45 (July
1993): 589.
7Calhoun, "Radicalism of Tradition," p. 153.
operationalized.
In Chapter II, I give an overview of the moral 
economist-political economist debate and demonstrate why 
Samuel Popkin's "economic” explanation of peasant behavior 
and peasant rationality cannot explain the significance of 
Calhoun's view or its implications on the broader question 
of collective action and mobilization. I offer evidence of 
peasant behavior that does not and cannot fit into existing 
moral or political economy frameworks. The validity of the 
testimonial evidence and field studies I present is clearly 
not a question to be answered, or even addressed, in this 
paper. I want instead to illustrate that we must consider a 
third possibility —  one which accounts for cultural 
influences —  and to test it empirically in future studies.
Finally, in Section IV, I explain why Popkin's theory 
falls short on explanatory power and return to the task of 
reconciling culture with rational behavior. Here I lay the 
groundwork for a conception of rationality that does 
consider specific cultural and traditional influences on 
peasant behavior and conclude with an explanation of why 
such a view is necessary to understand traditional peasants 
and their actions.
Chapter I;
What factors facilitate collective action within the 
traditional community?
In his article dealing with the significance of 
tradition in the popular mobilization of social, peasant 
communities, Craig Calhoun points to four ways in which 
traditional social foundations can facilitate and expedite 
mobilization or other collective action of community 
members.
First, Calhoun argues, members of traditional 
communities find it "relatively easy" to identify collective 
enemies. Elites or other community members who choose to 
set themselves apart from traditional communities thereby 
label themselves as outsiders and become potential enemies 
to the greater community. On the other hand, elites who 
integrate themselves into local communities decrease the 
likelihood that they will becomes victims of violent 
insurrection.8
Second, Calhoun asserts, because traditional 
communities are largely self-regulating, they are also 
easily agitated by outside intervention. Even the well 
intentioned efforts of "do-gooders" trying to "improve" the
8Calhoun, "Radicalism of Tradition," p. 153.
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8lives of peasant community members are viewed with mistrust, 
hostility and as threats to communal interests and welfare.9 
Traditional communities resent outsiders and constantly 
strive to defend their autonomy and function without 
interference from external influences.
Third, to the extent that a traditional community is 
autonomous, with significant power and ability to control 
the "labor process" of its members (e.g. maintaining crops, 
selling food or crafts, or raising animals for market) it 
can also control a considerable amount of members' social 
lives. Because they have enormous control over the social, 
political and economic lives of their members, traditional 
communities perceive themselves as being justly unchecked 
from interference and exploitation by elites. Elite 
intervention only disrupts the normal functions and customs 
of the community and its members.
Fourth, traditional communities have the foundation for 
"mobilization outside the purview of the intended targets of 
collective action, a free 'social space.'"10 By extension,
9Catholic intervention into Central American peasant 
communities is a perfect example. While such intervention has at 
times been well accepted by these communities, they were more often 
met with (sometimes violent) rejection and refusal. Even 
communities which have adopted all or part of Catholicism did so 
only after much conflict and controversy. See: Robert M. Carmack, 
The Quiche Mavas of Utatl£n. The Evolution of a Highland Kingdom. 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981), pp. 305-20, 332, 335- 
41, 360, 364-365, 375. Or: James D. Sexton, ed., Son of Tectin Uman. 
A Mava Indian Tells His Life Storv (Tucson: University of Arizona 
Press, 1981), pp. 15, 25, 88, 139-40, 168, 213-14.
10Calhoun, "Radicalism of Tradition," p. 154.
9I believe Calhoun is arguing that there is at least a 
foundation of ideological uniformity existing within 
traditional communities that liberates them from "the need 
to work through formal, non-communal organizations [in which 
social] movements must always be exposed to ideological 
counter attacks."11 A powerful and controlling sense of 
common identity shared by members of traditional, peasant 
communities has both pragmatic and intangible implications. 
In other words, the shared identity provides community 
members with specific roles to play or functions to fulfill 
as well as a sense of belonging a distinct 
ethnic/religious/linguistic group and knowing one's place 
within the community. The following segment will elucidate 
these four assertions with illustrations of traditional 
peasant behavior and attitudes.
Empirical evidence: Studies of traditional communities in 
Central America: The Mavan and Miskito Indians
Perhaps the most famous Indian from contemporary 
Guatemala is Rigoberta Menchti, a young woman who won a Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1993 for her autobiographical testimony, Me 
Llamo Riaoberta MenchU y as1 me nacio la conciencia.12 In 
the introduction of her intimate autobiography, which 
includes both personal experiences and detailed descriptions
nIbid.
12Rigoberta Menchu, Me Llamo Riaoberta MenchCi v asl me nacio la 
conciencia. Elizabeth Burgos, ed. (Barcelona: Argos Vergara, S.A., 
1983) . Translated edition: Riaoberta Menchti. an Indian Woman in 
Guatemala, trans. Ann Wright (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1984).
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of her community's cultural activities and traditions,
Menchti writes, "I'd like to stress that [this is] not only 
my life, it's also the testimony of my people....The 
important thing is that what has happened to me happened to 
many other people too: My story is the story of all poor 
Guatemalans. My personal experience is the reality of a 
whole people."13
MenchCi illustrates both Calhoun's four points and the 
broader goal of this thesis: to show that rationality is not 
solely based on economic self-interest but also on the 
cultural and traditional forces functioning within each 
distinct community. I begin by drawing out her confirmation 
of Calhoun's argument and conclude with support for my own.
Calhoun's first point is that traditional communities 
can readily identify their common enemies. Michael Taylor 
confirms: "Part of the cohesion of the rural community [is]
13MenchCi, An Indian Woman in Guatemala, p. 1. I view Rigoberta 
Menchu's testimony as a very powerful and representative 
description of Guatemalan Indian life. This view has been affirmed 
by anthropologists and cultural sociologists who focus their 
attention on the rich and extremely complex mosaic that is 
Guatemalan society. John Beverley and Marc Zimmerman write: 
"...[T]he specific structure of socioeconomic dependency in Central 
America...positions literature as a crucial ideological 
practice....[P]articularly in situations of large-scale political 
mobilization like revolutionary movements, the unity of a class or 
people is fundamentally a symbolic unity constructed in discursive 
practices." Given the illiteracy and lack of institutionalization 
of literature at both national and regional levels within 
Guatemala, Rigoberta has taken it upon herself (and taught herself 
Spanish) to become a voice of protest against the social, economic 
and political injustice suffered by her community and her people as 
a whole. See Beverley and Zimmerman, Literature and Politics in 
the Central American Revolutions. (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1990), p. x.
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derived...from the shared opposition of its members toward
the lords, whose depredations engender...among peasants a
defensive unity that [can] overc[o]me their internal
differences.1,14 By revealing the meaning of "enemy" in her
community, how that meaning evolved and why it is important
for her people to recognize groups and individuals hostile
to her race and culture, MenchCi amplifies Calhoun's claims
and illustrates the desire for communal autonomy. In the
following passage, she explains the construction of the
"insider versus outsider," or "us versus them" mentality:
We began to understand that the root of all our 
problems was exploitation. That there were rich 
and poor and that the rich exploited the poor —  
our sweat, our labor. That's how they got richer 
and richer . The fact that we were always... bowing 
to the authorities was part of the discrimination 
we Indians suffered. So was the cultural 
oppression which tries to divide us by taking away 
our traditions....15
According to Menchu, therefore, enemies were defined as
those who capitalized on the poverty, hunger and suffering
of Indians and who worked to maintain their power advantage
over indigenous peoples by keeping them poor and
unorganized. She continues:
The moment I lerned (sic) to identify our enemies 
was very important for me. For me now the 
landowner was a big enemy, an evil one. The 
soldier too was a criminal enemy. And so were all 
the rich. We began using the term "enemies" 
because we didn't have the notion of enemy in our
14Michael Taylor, "Structure, Culture and Action in the 
Explanation of Social Change," Politics & Society Vol. 17, No 2 
(June 1989): 125.
15Menchu, An Indian Woman in Guatemala, p. 118.
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culture, until those people arrived to exploit us 
and discriminate against us.... The ladinos16 
behave like a superior race. Apparently there was 
a time when the ladinos used to think we were not 
people at all, but some sort of animal. All this 
became clear to me.17
After recognizing personally that the suffering of her
people was not their destiny and that they did not have to
wait a lifetime to finally have a "decent” life in heaven,18
Menchti felt the need to share her ideas with others. It is
clear from Menchti's description of her work, that
identifying "enemies" was not the difficult task for her
people, fighting them was. The author recounts the words of
her community's elders:
Who is to blame for [Indian suffering]? The White 
Man who came to our country. We must not trust 
them, white men are all thieves. We must keep our
16In the context of Rigoberta Menchu7s testimony ladino 
signifies: "[A]ny Guatemalan, whatever his economic position, who 
rejects, either individually or through his cultural heritage, 
Indian values of Mayan origin. It also implies mixed blood."
See: Menchti, An Indian Woman in Guatemala, p. 249.
17Ibid. , pp. 124-25.
18Menchu acknowledges that she is a Christian and that she has 
been influenced by Catholic Action's activities in her community, 
as well as by priests and nuns she encountered in other regions of 
Guatemala. For her, Catholicism is not so much a religion as it is 
a "form of expression." She emphasizes that believing in Christ is 
in no way a betrayal of her culture because she and her people have 
accepted Catholicism only to the extent that it is in harmony with 
traditional religious beliefs. (For example, both religions 
profess that there is only one God.) She therefore rejects the 
labeling of her community as polytheistic.
Menchu's religious beliefs and therefore, her statements, are 
notably influenced by "liberation theology." (For example, the 
notion that the destiny of her people is not to suffer indefinitely 
in this life.) Despite frequent references to the tenets of 
liberation theology, however, the author never directly 
acknowledges any allegiance with or belief in that school of 
thought.
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secrets from them.19
Therefore, in MenchCi's eyes, Indians did not need to be
told where the social, political and cultural oppression
originated in their country. Instead, they were interested
in developing mechanisms for protecting themselves and
preserving their way of life. She describes the development
of her own awareness of the Indian situation in Guatemala:
...[W]hen you see your own reality, a hatred grows 
inside you for those oppressors that make the 
people suffer so.... [I]t is not fate which makes 
us poor. It's not because we don't work, as the 
rich say. They say: 'Indians are poor because 
they're always asleep.' But I know from 
experience that we're outside ready for work at
three in the morning. It was this that made us
decide to fight. This is what motivated me and 
many others.... I knew that teaching others how to 
defend themselves against the enemy was a 
commitment I had to make —  a commitment to my 
people and my commitment as a Christian.20
MenchCi's work to improve the lives of her people,
therefore, began with two primary components. First, the
indigenous population recognized their "common enemy" as the
exploiters and oppressors of their labor and culture.
Second, as Menchu explains, Indian communities had to decide
what it was, exactly, for which they wanted to fight. She
concludes her story with unwavering belief in her cause:
We all contribute in different ways, but we are 
working for the same objective.... [I]t wasn't 
born out of something good, it was born out of 
wretchedness and bitterness. It has been 
radicalized by the poverty in which my people 
live. It has been radicalized by the malnutrition
19Ibid, p. 69.
20Ibid. , pp. 133-41.
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which I, as an Indian, have seen and experienced.
And by the exploitation and discrimination which 
I've felt in the flesh. And by the oppression 
which prevents us performing our ceremonies, and 
shows no respect for our way of life, the way we 
are.... [M]y commitment to our struggle knows no 
boundaries. 21
Menchti's words make clear that the objects of her
community's struggle included not only political, social and
economic rights for the impoverished indigenous population,
but cultural rights as well. Recognition and respect of
cultural beliefs and traditions constitute a vital part of
the struggle in Rigoberta's community and in other
indigenous populations in Central America.
Menchd's testimony also provides support for Calhoun's
second claim, that traditional communities are easily
disrupted by any outside intervention, including that of
"do-gooders.” During her description of communal wedding
ceremonies, she comments:
[The community members] insist that they don't 
desire what the rich have. We have hands to make 
our pottery with and we don't want to lose the 
skill. They say: 'These things may be modern but 
we mustn't buy the rubbish they [ladinos] have, 
even if we have the money. We must keep our ways 
of making our own.' Our village does not have a 
grinder for our maize. This is not because we 
could not get one. Many landowners would gladly 
install one to grind the maize for the whole 
village. But our people say no. The ladinos 
bring their machines in little by little and soon 
they own everything.22
Menchu insists that community members view traditional ways
21Ibid. , pp. 246-47.
22Ibid. , p. 72.
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as superior to "modern” ways of living, simply because they 
are culturally significant. In her words, "Generations and 
generations will pass but we will always be Indians. It is 
our duty...to keep our secrets safe generation after 
generation, to prevent the ladinos from learning anything of 
our ancestors' ways."23 This example is especially 
important because maize (or corn) is sacred in the 
traditional Maya-Quich4 religion, which identifies the 
Indians as "men of maize."24 Planting, tending, harvesting 
and grinding corn are all sacred activities within the Maya 
Quiche culture. To give up or alter even one step of the 
corn-growing process would, therefore, mean departing from 
ancient ways and breaking with sacred tradition.
Maintaining their antiquated farming and cooking techniques 
is an important aspect of Maya Quiche life, not because the 
traditions are efficient or economical, but because they 
have cultural meaning and affirm solidarity with communal 
ancestors.
In addition to the inherent hostility existing between 
unequals in a social hierarchy which may prevent cooperation 
among members of different classes, Menchu makes it clear
23Menchu, An Indian Woman in Guatemala, pp. 67-8.
24The Pooul Vuh. Sacred Book of the Ancient Quiche Mava. 
explains that the first four humans were created out of a corn 
paste. Corn was the plant most venerated by the ancient Maya 
Indians. See Adrian Recinos, PopuI Vuh. The Sacred Book of the 
Ancient Quiche Mava. trans. Delia Goetz and Sylvanus G. Morley 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1950), p. 62. Also see 
Miguel Angel Asturias, Men of Maize. (Buenos Aires: Editorial
Losada, 1949).
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that her community refuses to "modernize" its equipment 
simply because it would necessitate deviation from ancestral 
customs and rituals. While acknowledging that resistance to 
modern technology can mean an often "primitive" lifestyle, 
the community repudiates "modernization" in the sense that 
it would require departure from traditional cultural 
practices.
In his book about the Maya-Quiche Indians living in the
Utalan, Robert Carmack describes an example of Indian
behavior which provides additional support for the second
tenet of Calhoun's argument. He explains:
In the hands of Spanish priests who administered 
in the Quiche area, Catholic Action launched a 
direct assault on traditional Quiche religion.
Every community experienced a holy war of sorts 
between the catequistas (progressives) and the 
costumbristas (traditionalists). Violence erupted 
often, especially in the 1950's. At Santa Cruz 
the priests managed to eradicate the burning of 
candles to the ancestors in the church, but when 
they tried to take the Buried Jesus Saint from the 
control of the cofriadas,25 a struggle ensued.
Several converts to Catholic Action were thrown in 
jail and the traditionalists even tried 
unsuccessfully to have the priest removed from his 
post.... Later the priest tried to abolish the 
cofriada ritual and other "customs" practiced in 
the church. The traditionalists rose up in arms 
and attacked the convent. The priest barely 
escaped with his life and returned later with an 
armed guard. The traditionalists were too 
powerful to be blocked in Chichicastenago, and to 
the present day the priests do not interfere with 
them.26
25Carmack describes cofriadas as eight religious cults that 
play a significant role in Quiche-Maya religious rituals.
26Carmack, The Ouiche-Mava of Utalan. p. 361.
Gruhn, R.; "Observations in Chichicastenago in 1969," 
Estudias de Cultura Mava 9 (1973): 247-48.
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Carmack's account provides an excellent example of peasant
resistance to interference into their communities. What is
particularly relevant in this case is the fact that the
intervention into the community was by priests, or "do-
gooders” who presumably sought to better the lives (and
afterlives1) of the village members.
In his book Mv Car in Managua. Forrest Colburn provides
an equally powerful illustration of peasant resistance to
intervention into communal life, regardless of the
charitable motivations of the interfering organization.
Here, Colburn describes the effect of socialist intervention
into the Nicaraguan Corn Islands (home to primarily Miskito
Indians) after the fall of Somoza in 1979:
The Somozas ignored the Atlantic Coast and it 
ignored them.... Although there was no fighting 
anywhere on the Atlantic side during the 
Sandinistas' insurrection, their 1979 victory had 
immediate consequences for the Corn Islands.... As 
the regime consolidated its power, it announced 
that it would seek broader-based economic growth 
on the Atlantic Coast, and would try to mesh the 
hitherto "marginalized” territory into the nation 
as a whole. Unhappily, in practice, both the 
efforts to promote equitable development and the 
moves toward integration have disrupted the 
islanders' way of life.... Perhaps the greatest 
potential importance in these circumstances would 
be a government promise to grant the entire 
Atlantic Coast increased autonomy. Nothing would 
please the inhabitants of the Corn Islands more.
An articulate young woman captured the essence of 
the situation when she commented ironically, "The 
Sandinistas want to liberate us, but we are too 
independent to be liberated."27
According to Colburn, the Miskito Indians provide another
^Forrest D. Colburn Mv Car in Managua (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1991) pp. 87-97.
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example of a traditional, cultural community that resents 
outside intervention into its affairs, however "benevolent” 
the motives of the intervening party. As Calhoun has 
argued, maintenance of autonomy is one of the community's 
foremost goals.
To promote Calhoun's third point —  that traditional 
communities have tremendous control over the social lives 
and social behavior of their members —  I again draw 
examples from the Mayan and Miskito Indians living in 
Central America.28
Rigoberta Menchti reinforces Calhoun's argument with 
extensive descriptions of Maya-Quiche communal life and the 
importance of adhering to cultural norms in order to be 
accepted into the community at large. For example, Menchu 
explains her relationship with her parents by stating: "They 
gave me the freedom to do what I wanted with my life as long 
as, first and foremost, I obeyed the laws of our ancestors. 
That's when they taught me not to abuse my own dignity— both
28I wish here to acknowledge the limitation of available 
resources dealing with the Miskito Indians and their culture. 
While I have found various sources to support Calhoun's third and 
fourth points (and my own broader argument) I want to make known 
that the majority of literature that even mentions the Miskitos 
does so in reference to their political confrontations with the 
Sandinistas after the fall of Somoza in 1979. The few detailed 
accounts of Miskito communities that I have encountered appear (at 
least to someone who has not been there first hand) at times 
outdated and often culturally biased in favor of European/North 
American heritage. I believe, however, that while we must read 
this data with knowledge of its era, it can provide both 
interesting information and support for this thesis paper if we 
"read between the lines." This point will be more fully 
illustrated in the remaining explanation of Calhoun's argument.
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as a woman and a member of our race.”29 Menchti's comments 
imply that within her community, cultural laws supersede 
political and more general (ladino) social laws. At very 
least, she seeks to create a space in which her culture can 
be preserved against the "predatorial," dominant culture.
Because, as Menchti reveals in the remainder of her 
testimony, her Maya-Quiche ancestors had something to say 
about practically every aspect of social life,30 obeying 
their laws is no simple task, but instead, something which 
requires conscious effort on a daily basis. It then becomes 
obvious to the reader that the "freedom" which Menchti 
mentions, given the tremendous amount of ancestral custom 
that one must follow, does not really allow for social 
independence at all.31
Menchti intentionally acknowledges the social autonomy 
of her community throughout her text, in my view, to draw 
attention to the unique quality of the Maya-Quiche culture 
and the importance of protecting its distinct customs, 
religion, dress and language. The rejection of "modern"
29Menchtt, An Indian Woman in Guatemala, p. 59.
30For example, there is ancestral "law" dealing with family 
relations; birth, marriage and death ceremonies; work, relationship 
with the earth; proper treatment of elders, pregnant women, 
parents, siblings and spouses; religion; celebrations, and gender 
roles, just name a few of the topics that Ms. Menchti discusses in 
her testimony.
31 It is important to note that the author does not regard these 
laws as limitations to her social freedom, but as meaningful, 
sacred guidelines to help individuals and the greater community 
structure a honorable life in accordance with a rich and 
multifacetous cultural heritage.
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maize-grinders in favor of ancient ways of hand-grinding 
principle foodstuffs is representative of a broader sense of 
internal (or cultural) moral superiority. In her discussion 
of communal marriage ceremonies, Menchti remarks: The outside 
world —  which we know is disgusting —  has set a bad 
example and has started giving us pills and gadgets.... The 
thing is, to us, using medicine to stop having children is 
like killing your own children. It's negating the laws of 
our ancestors....1,32
Later in the discussion, Menchti reiterates the 
importance of adhering to ancestral law: [W]hen a couple
gets married in our community, they have to preserve our 
traditions and act as an example for their brothers and 
sisters and for their neighbors' children. It's a very 
important commitment for us."33 She recounts a similar 
penalty for breaking with communal tradition: "In our 
community, if a girl is seen in the street with a boy, she 
both loses her dignity and breaks the customs of our 
forefathers."34 In both of these examples, Menchti indicates 
that breaking with traditional culture is synonymous with 
becoming dishonorable in the eyes of the community. 
Preserving tradition is tantamount to preserving life 
itself; for the Maya-Quiche people, living without cultural
32Ibid. , p. 60. (My emphasis.)
33Ibid. , p. 62.
^Ibid., p. 63
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practice likens to nonexistence.
More often than not, the internal focus of Menchu's 
community appears to be a defensive mechanism for protecting 
its cultural autonomy and resisting acculturation into the 
more politically and economically powerful ladino community. 
She declares: ”[0]ur grandparents say of Coca-Cola: 'Never 
let your children drink this dreadful stuff because it is 
something which threatens our culture.V They say: 'These 
things are made by machines; our forefathers never used 
machines.'” And later on: ”We must not mix our customs with
those of the Whites. So we don't eat bread. It is not our
tortilla.... Don't let our children get used to eating
bread; our ancestors had no bread.” It becomes obvious from
Menchti's testimony that there is indeed an enormous amount 
of social control in her community, ranging, as we have 
seen, from marriage protocol and courting etiquette to the 
consumption of soft drinks.
An equally relevant portrayal of a traditional, 
cultural community's social control over its inhabitants 
exists among the Miskito Indians on the Atlantic Coast of 
Nicaragua. As I have briefly mentioned, information about 
this group of people is limited and dated. In contrast, 
information about the Mayan Indians is plentiful. Despite 
these empirical shortcomings I have attempted to use the 
information I have found to support both Calhoun's argument 
and my own thesis.
The 1982 MISURASATA Charter of the United Nations for
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Indigenous Unity35, while clearly influenced by Sandinist
rhetoric, provides insight into the goals and values of the
Miskito Indians as well as the Sumu and Rama, two smaller
Indian groups living in Nicaragua. The document states:
Our education should provide our children with a 
knowledge of their own culture, so that they can 
be proud of it and in this way strengthen their 
ethnic identity.... The Sandinist State must 
guarantee our indigenous people their right to 
exist, to live in accordance with our customs and 
to develop our cultures, since they constitute 
specific ethnic identities —  that is to say, the 
right to maintain and develop our cultures, 
languages and traditions. We do not want to 
imitate foreign forms, but to be as we are.
Therefore, we strive that our Sandinist country be 
a truly multi-ethnic state, in which each ethnic 
group has the right of self-determination and a 
free choice of social and cultural alternatives.36
These goals most obviously include protection of cultural
autonomy and tradition. By extension, though, we can
understand these goals as also signifying a recognizable
value being placed upon the existence of enforceable social
norms within the Miskito communities.
In an entirely different sort of document, the
Smithsonian Institution's 1932 Ethnographic Survey of the
35MISURASATA stands for Miskito, Sumu, Rama and Sandinistas 
United. The organization represents a Nicaraguan indigenous 
movement founded in November, 1979. See National Revolution and 
Indigenous Identity: The Conflict between Sandinists and Miskito 
Indians on Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast. Klaudine Ohland and Robin 
Schneider, eds. (Copenhagen: International Work Group for
Indigenous Affairs, 1982), pp. 38-41, 48-63, 68-72, 89-94, 163-177, 
203-217.
36"Lineamientos Generalesz 1982 Charter of the United Nations 
for Indigenous Unity" National Revolution and Indigenous Identity, 
the conflict between Sandinistas and Miskito Indians on Nicaragua's 
Atlantic Coast pp. 48-64.
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Miskito and Sumu Indians of Honduras and Nicaragua.
adherence to social norms is also evident. Despite the
\
ethnocentric and often racist tone of the survey, readers
are able to glean some notion of Miskito social life. The
author's descriptions are at times condescending and clearly
skewed by his subjective interpretation of Miskito
lifestyle; nonetheless, he reveals that the community is
ruled —  like the more "modern” example of Menchti's
community —  with strict adherence to social norms. Not
surprisingly, these norms deal with many of the same aspects
of life which I have discussed with respect to the Mayan
Indians: religion, marriage, sexuality, birth rites,
childrearing and death ceremonies. The following passage
illustrates these norms while also providing a sense of the
content and tone of the author's work:
During the menstrual periods, "woman sickness,” 
the woman is considered unclean and is shunned by 
her husband. She must not touch any food intended 
for other people, otherwise the latter might 
die.... When the Miskito woman is inconvenienced 
in the accustomed manner, she occupies a small 
temporary hut built by her husband at a few 
hundred yards from the settlement. She remains 
there a couple of days.... While in this state of 
impurity the woman must not be seen by a sukya,
[holy man] for that would weaken the latter's 
connection with the spirits, and perhaps even 
cause his death. At the conclusion of the third 
day the woman bathes herself in a neighboring 
creek and then rejoins her family. All cooking 
vessels used by her during this period are broken 
and thrown away.37
37Eduard Conzemius, Ethnographical Survey of the Miskito and 
Sumu Indians of Honduras and Nicaragua: Smithsonian Institution 
Bureau of American Ethnology. Bulletin 106 (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1932), pp. 148-149.
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Clearly, the social behavior of Miskito women is not only
influenced by communal regulations, but dictated by them.
The author continues his description of Miskito life
with an account of a similarly restrictive and norm-based
behavior dealing with the death of a spouse :
Upon the death of his wife a man generally married 
her sister; similarly, if a woman has lost her 
husband, she was taken in marriage by her brother- 
in-law. For that reason, the names for stepfather 
and father's brother are identical in most of the 
dialects spoken on the Mosquito Coast. On the 
other hand, the children of brother and sister are 
not considered blood relatives, and a union 
between such cousins is the common, and originally 
perhaps, the only marriage allowed. Unions of 
this kind are still encouraged to this day, for it 
is felt that family ties are strengthened 
thereby.38
While the peculiarities of these customs may have evolved 
since the survey was written, the recent works of Forrest 
Colburn, Klaudine Ohland and Robin Schneider provide 
evidence that the substructure of communal influence on the 
social behavior of Miskito Indians retains a substantial 
amount of control over their lives.
Finally, Calhoun points to a fourth explanation of why 
traditional cultural communities are more readily mobilized 
into collective action than "modern" communities. He 
maintains that traditional communities have a foundation of 
ideological unity that confers upon them the notion of a 
"free social space." In other words, community members 
possess a common cultural identity which both results from
38Ibid., p. 146.
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and serves to protect the cultural distinctiveness and
autonomy of the group. Menchti substantiates this claim with
a personal account of Indian conflicts with Guatemalan
government officials and her community's attempts at
political and physical self-defense. While discussing the
development of the Comity Unidad Campesina (Committee for
Peasant Unity, or CUC) she defines the organization's goals:
"a fair wage from landowners; respect for our communities;
the decent treatment we deserve as people, not animals;
respect for our religion, our customs, our culture."39
Along with the political objectives of fair salaries and
adequate living conditions (goals not uncommon to an
oppressed people living in any state) Menchtl includes
recognition and consideration of her community's cultural
differences. Political goals and cultural goals have become
inextricably fused.
By repeatedly using the terms "our" and "we," Menchu's
testimony confirms Calhoun's notion of the ideological unity
of traditional community. She continues:
We can select what is truly relevant for our 
people. Our lives show us what this is. It has 
guaranteed our existence. Otherwise we would not 
have survived. We have rejected all the aims 
governments have tried to impose. It wasn't only 
me who did this, of course. I'm saying we did it 
together. Those are the conclusions my whole 
community came to.... [W]e have hidden our 
identity because we needed to resist, we wanted to 
protect what governments have wanted to take away 
from us. They have tried to take our things away 
and impose others on us, be it through religion,
39Menchti, An Indian Woman in Guatemala, p. 160. (My emphasis.)
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through dividing up the land, through schools, 
through books, through radio, through all things 
modern. This is why we maintain the rites for our 
ceremonies. And why we don't accept Catholic 
Action as the only way to God, and why we don't 
perform only Christian ceremonies. We don't want 
to because we know that they are weapons to take 
away what is ours.40
Similarly, in the MISURASATA Charter of the U.N. for
Indigenous Unity, the authors explain:
It is thought that if the Indio is to be liberated 
socially, there must be an end to his being an 
Indio; that is to say to crush his ethnic 
specificity and naturally integrate him into the 
national society. Certainly you may sometimes 
hear about the need to preserve cultural values, 
but these are empty words for nothing is done to 
put them into practice. Certain dogmatic Marxists 
also stubbornly ignore the question of ethnicity, 
despite the empirical facts. The complexities of 
inter-ethnic friction are squeezed into the narrow 
mould of class struggle. What this type of 
Marxism does not realize is that indigenous 
populations are able to act from a political 
consciousness that stems from an ethnic 
consciousness.... Our fundamental right 
should...be guaranteed that we can advance our own 
means of cultural, linguistic, social, religious, 
economic and political expression. "EVERY PEOPLE 
HAS THE RIGHT TO WORK FOR THE TRIUMPH OF THEIR OWN 
CULTURE. ”41
Both of these criticisms of cultural universalism and of 
dominant groups' "ignorance” of distinct ethnic groups 
endorse the notion that the Mayan and Miskito traditional 
communities are, at least to some degree, united by their 
common culture. This is not to ignore the fact that 
conflicts exist both within and among Indian communities;
40Ibid. , pp. 170-171.
41 "Charter of the United Nations for Indigenous Unity," pp. 
60-3. (My emphasis; capitalization original.)
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instead, the passages set forth evidence that Indian 
identity is primary for both groups. Furthermore, the 
"ethnic consciousness" to which the authors refer gives 
credence to Calhoun's belief in the traditional community's 
foundation of ideological solidarity.
I have illustrated in this section of the paper that 
substantial evidence exists to support Calhoun's four 
premises concerning the mobilization of traditional 
communities. If his thesis were accurate, the evidence 
points to the conclusion that traditional communities are 
indeed more readily mobilized into collective action than 
non-traditional communities. My objective here is to 
establish that evidence indeed exists to uphold Calhoun's 
proposal, and explicitly not to address the second half of 
his argument. I offer this paper as a theoretical critique 
of political economy and not an empirical critique 
concerning actual mobilization of traditional communities 
into political action.
In the following section, I provide a detailed account 
of Popkin's intervention into the moral economy versus 
political economy debate. The purpose of Chapter II is to 
give the reader an overview of Popkin's position and thereby 
reveal why his understanding of peasant rationality cannot 
explain the behaviors and ideas which I have examined 
through Calhoun's four points. In Chapter III, I propose an 
alternative theoretical conception of rationality to account 
for these behaviors and ideas. I conclude by supporting my
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proposal with empirical evidence.
Chapter II:
Moral Economy and Popkin's Counteraction
Because Popkin's reasoning in The Rational Peasant is 
first and foremost a response to Scott's The Moral Economy 
of the Peasant. I begin this analysis with an overview of 
the "moral economy" approach and a summary of its principal 
arguments.
A. Scott's View of Moral Economy
Moral economy maintains that peasant violence is a 
solely defensive reaction against capitalism and an attempt 
to preserve the pre-capitalist structures that insure 
peasant welfare.42 In this view, resistance only 
perpetuates a rigid social hierarchy and the primacy of the 
dominant over the weak. Scott claims that colonialism, 
state formation and capitalism handicap peasant security by 
increasing the social inequality and stratification that
42 James C. Scott argues that peasants will fight to maintain 
or restore the pre-capitalist institutions that preserve the 
communal "welfare system" on which they depend for survival. This 
system, he claims, provides money, food, clothing, shelter and 
health care for peasants lacking the resources to provide for their 
own (or their family's) survival in economically difficult times. 
These institutions also provide consistent protection from 
starvation with collective insurance schemes— such as scattered- 
plot cultivation— which safeguard against the spoliation or 
destruction of any one family's food supply. See: Scott, The Moral 
Economy of the Peasant. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1976), pp. 13-55.
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force peasants into isolation, where they lack the insurance 
and protection of their traditional cultural or village 
institutions.
As a corollary to peasant distrust of unreliable 
sources of income, moral economy holds that security is 
paramount within peasant communities. Because peasants are 
consistently close to falling below the "danger line," or 
minimal subsistence level,43 even minute drops in 
production or income can trigger a disaster within the 
peasant household. Peasants strive to grow enough food for 
themselves and their families; that is, the "safety first" 
principle states that peasants are averse to financial risk 
and focus on avoiding losses rather than maximizing profits 
to improve living standards.
Scott argues that capitalist development within peasant 
communities thwarts the aim of their "moral economy" by
turning labor, food and land into merchandise, where
previously access to such commodities had been fundamental 
"rights" due to all village members, regardless of economic 
prosperity. In other words, by including land and labor in 
a competitive market, the substance of peasant society
43Scott writes: "While a minimum income has solid physiological 
dimensions, we must not overlook its social and cultural 
implications. In order to be a fully functioning member of village 
society, a household needs a certain level of resources to 
discharge its necessary ceremonial and social obligations as well 
as to feed itself adequately and continue to cultivate. To fall 
below this level is not only to risk starvation, it is too suffer
a profound loss of standing within the community and perhaps to
fall into a permanent situation of dependence." See Scott, The 
Moral Economy of the Peasant, p. 9.
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becomes subordinate to the laws of that market and 
eliminates the tendencies toward "leveling" and 
"inclusiveness" that exist in the well-functioning moral 
economy.
Another moral economist, Eric Wolf, notes that 
"capitalism 'liberated' man as an economic agent, but the 
concrete process of liberation entailed the accumulation of 
human suffering against which anti-capitalist critics, 
conservatives and radicals alike, [have] direct[ed] their 
social and moral criticism,1,44 Moral economy views peasant 
welfare as inversely related to commercial progress in a 
capitalist market. Because they provide the greatest 
insurance of peasants' well-being, eradicating traditional 
institutions generates tensions which can eventually erupt 
into revolt and revolution.
Moral economists maintain that peasants' traditional 
distaste for buying and selling in a market atmosphere 
develops because of their subsistence lifestyle, which is 
most cases, provides only enough food for an individual or 
family's subsistence. No food typically remains to be 
marketed from peasants' harvest, and on the rare occasion 
that it does, surplus is likely to be shared with needy 
extended family members or the village poor, as religious
^Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: 
Harper & Row Publishers, 1969) p. 280.
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and cultural obligations dictate.45 Because surplus is 
rare,46 preserving the "right to subsistence" through 
cultural institutions like these is generally the peasant's 
primary interest. Such village organizations, moral 
economist argue, are organized to insure subsistence for the 
poorest villagers by making demands on "wealthier" ones when 
it becomes economically necessary to do so. In contrast to 
this relative security of village institutions and communal 
insurance schemes, capitalist markets provide only an 
unpredictable, inconsistent means to satisfy subsistence 
needs. Therefore, according to moral economy, peasants turn 
to organized, capitalist markets only when unable to satisfy 
their subsistence needs and cultural obligations through
45 James C. Scott explains such behavior in a Malaysian village 
in which he lived and studied: "Razak's family [example of an
extremely poor villager's family] received enough gifts of paddy 
and rice to feed them for perhaps three months. At the end of 
Ramadan it is the duty of each Moslem to make a religious gift of 
rice, called fitrah. In addition to the customary gifts to the 
mosque, the iman, and the village prayer house, rice is often 
given, one gallon at a time, to poor relatives and neighbors, 
particularly those who have worked for the farmer making the gift. 
Razak was given nearly tens gallons of rice as fitrah...and smaller 
gifts on the second major Islamic feast day a month later. [On the 
third occasion for religious gifts] Razak received a gunny sack of 
paddy from his eldest brother... and four or five gallons from the 
village.. . . See Scott, Weapons of the Weak (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1985), pp. 1-13, 86-91.
^In The Moral Economy of the Peasant. Weapons of the Weak and 
Me Llamo Riaoberta Menchti v asl me nacio la conciencia. James Scott 
and Rigoberta Menchu detail the vulnerable and erratic lifestyle 
found in subsistence-farming communities. The authors demonstrate 
not only the rarity of surplus for the subsistence farmer, but also 
the infrequency of a peasant family to even have enough to feed 
themselves and/or carry out their cultural or religious 
obligations.
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local organizations.47
Moral economists believe that stable social 
relationships are necessary for maintaining village 
security, giving each individual a stake in protecting the 
community as a whole and forcing him or her to internalize 
the need for social stability. This internalization, 
manifests itself in peasants' deliberate efforts to adhere 
to the traditional roles that have historically provided 
them with security. The economic goal of the peasant 
household is to provide itself with sustenance and to 
fulfill necessary social, religious and moral obligations. 
These goals lead moral economists to insist that peasants' 
needs are defined by their culture. In other words, the 
peasant's production must account for cultural as well as 
physiological needs.
Because social stability performs an important function 
within peasant communities, social unity is crucial to 
peasant villages. Systematic participation in village 
activities helps promote collective interests and distinct 
village identity. Moral economists claim that this solid 
communal identity helps to foster collective, consensual 
decision-making, control internal conflicts and preclude the 
individualistic focus on material gain that is fostered and 
even encouraged within capitalist societies.
Though many of the tenets of moral economy appear to
47Wolf, Peasants. pp. 44-55.
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romanticize peasant behavior,48 proponents of the doctrine 
generally acknowledge that mistrust, antipathy and 
individual frictions indeed exist within peasant societies. 
Notwithstanding the conflict existing within the 
communities, moral economists assert that the village 
institutions and organizations assist in surmounting these 
conflicts and enable the communities to provide minimal 
subsistence and welfare for all their members. Calhoun 
observes: "[Blinding relationships may be full of conflict. 
As the Arab proverb has it, 'I against my brothers; I and my 
brothers against my cousins; I, my brothers and my cousins 
against the world.'" Moral economists recognize that 
communal solidarity does not necessarily indicate a high 
level of communal harmony. While the two entities are 
surely related, they can also exist in isolation from one 
another.49
B. Popkin's Answer to Moral Economy
Like other critics of James Scott and the moral economy 
view,50 Samuel Popkin criticizes the moral economy analysis
48For example, Popkin argues against the notion that patron- 
client associations among peasants are comparable to extended 
family relationships. Popkin believes patron-client relations are 
strictly business ventures organized so that each party benefits 
from participating in the contract.
49Calhoun, "The Radicalism of Tradition," p. 145.
50For example, see William J. Booth, "A Note on the Idea of the 
Moral Economy," American Political Science Review Vol. 87, No. 4 
(December, 1993): 949-54. Or: Philip G. Roeder, "Legitimacy and 
Peasant Revolution: An Alternative to Moral Economy," Peasant
Studies Vol. 11, No. 3 (Spring 1984): 149-66.
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of peasant societies for being overly confident in the 
virtue of traditional communities and their members.
Contrary to Scott's arguments, Samuel Popkin believes the 
majority of moral economy's central claims are unsupported 
and unexamined.51 He has developed in contrast a "political 
economy" view of peasants' individual and collective 
decision-making processes, which he claims is a more 
accurate account of peasant behavior and institutions. 
Despite Popkin's unyielding objection to the basic premises 
of moral economy, there are a few components of the view 
which he does find compelling. For example, political and 
moral economists agree that peasants are controlled by the 
constant threat and fear of falling below subsistence level 
and jeopardizing their personal and familial safety. To 
summarize Popkin's view, I detail his primary opposition and 
response to moral economy and then review the subsidiary 
components of his argument. Through the careful breakdown 
of political economy, the reader will see that Popkin's view 
remains limited by its incapacity to reckon with the 
behaviors and ideas examined in the previous chapter.
The first and primary conflict between moral and 
political economy arises over diverging concepts of the 
production, consumption and exchange of material goods
51For example, Popkin argues against moral economy's treatment 
of investments and gambles made by peasants, community "norms," the 
free-rider problem within peasant communities, patron-client 
relations and peasant goals and rationality. These topics will be 
addressed in detail later in this paper.
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within peasant societies. Popkin disagrees with what he 
terms moral economy's "idealistic" notion of peasant 
motivation for communal rather than individual gain. That 
is, unlike moral economists, Popkin believes that peasants 
seek not only to maintain their current living standards but 
also to raise their subsistence levels through both short- 
and long-term investments and gambles. He asserts (in 
contrast with the information which Rigoberta Menchu has 
contributed to the investigation) that peasants rely on 
family investments to provide long-term security (having 
many children, for example) and village-wide initiatives or 
communal investments to provide shorter-term gains.52 
Assuming many of these investments are unpredictable, Popkin 
believes moral economy's "safety first" assumptions about 
subsistence floors are often misleading and at times, 
entirely wrong.53
52For example, the peasant couple will have many children to 
insure that someone will provide for them and care for their land 
when they are too old to do it themselves. In the short term, 
peasants may contribute to village food cooperatives to insure 
themselves against failed or ruined crops during a particularly 
risky (hot, rainy, cold) season.
53For example, according to James C. Scott, the "safety first" 
principle holds that peasants will overlook opportunities to 
increase their earnings dramatically through risky investments by 
instead seeking to maintain their current (often minimal) earnings 
in a risk-free manner. For example, a peasant farmer prefers to 
grow a cheap, easily grown and edible crop (like rice) over a more 
lucrative but unreliable crop such as tobacco or rubber. The 
former is very likely to grow at least enough rice to sustain the 
family until the next season, even if not enough remains to be 
marketed. On the other hand, although a good tobacco crop would be 
quite lucrative, a failed tobacco crop is likely to mean 
insufficient amounts of food and money to last until the following 
season. For a more detailed discussion of this principle, see
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Specifically, Popkin disagrees with moral economy's 
notion that peasant villages propagate the "safety first" 
system through community-wide security measures that value 
community welfare over individual welfare. Popkin rejects 
moral economy's assumption that villages function to provide 
"safety first" for their members. He terms this belief "a 
direct leap from common interest to collective outcome,"54 
and contends that collective rationality within peasant 
communities is only a fallacy of moral economy.55 In other 
words, Popkin rejects the notion that peasants seek to 
preserve or propagate collective interests and argues 
instead, that like those living in capitalist societies, 
peasants are primarily interested in protecting their 
individual and familial interests.
In Popkin's view, peasants frequently make risky 
investments in addition to cautious, risk-free investments 
consistent with moral economy. The peasant is "rational" in 
the Downsian sense that he has his own (or his family's) 
best interest in mind at all times, and seeks to reap the
Scott's The Moral Economy of the Peasant pp.4-13, 15-26, 29, 35, 
197-201.
^Popkin, The Rational Peasant, p. 38.
55This is one of the main arguments I have with Popkin as I 
believe that a sense collective rationality does exist in relation 
to culture, as in the discussion of Calhoun's points three and 
four. In fact, as we have seen, this collective rationality, or 
"collective consciousness" plays an important role in the 
mobilization and collective action of peasant communities.
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most profit from the least possible about of work.56 
"Moral” behavior for the good of the community, therefore, 
is not really perceived as a collective insurance scheme, 
but as a way of protecting the individual and his or her 
family. Because the peasant perceives commodities and 
wealth as limited resources within the village, all 
individual and familial desire for economic advancement is 
necessarily a zero-sum game which precipitates intra-village 
conflict. Again, contrary to this argument, Rigoberta 
Menchu and others have provided evidence in the earlier 
discussion that ubiquitous scarcity can actually encourage 
cooperation and socialization to norms of sharing and 
general open-handedness within the traditional community.
Popkin rejects moral economy's belief that "better-off" 
villagers will come to the aid of their poorer neighbors in 
times of economic hardship. His own analysis of Vietnamese 
peasant communities demonstrated that the most destitute 
individuals were actually excluded from their villages, even 
before they fell to subsistence level. Popkin found that it 
was not community members, but the outsiders (the Viet Minh, 
in his case study) who intervened into village relations to 
help foster stability and protect the lower economic strata 
from expulsion or landlessness by increasing tax revenues or
56Anthony Downs defines a rational actor as "a man who moves 
toward his goals in a way which, to the best of his knowledge, uses 
the least possible input of scarce resources per unit of valued 
output." See: An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper 
Collins Publishers, 1957), p. 5.
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forcing villagers to clear soil for the landless.
Popkin concludes from these findings that the moral 
economists' "metaphor of corporate village as 'collectivity' 
should be replaced by the metaphor of the corporative 
village as 'corporation.'"57 In other words, village 
membership does not indicate special tax breaks, welfare or 
insurance, but merely the license to do business and the 
freedom to use the institutions and organizations within the 
village and the larger peasant community. Once again, 
Menchti, Carmack, Rafaga and Colburn have demonstrated that 
at the very least, Popkin's conclusions here are far from 
being universal. What is "true" for Vietnamese peasants of 
the mid-twentieth century is not necessarily true for 
peasants living under different circumstances and/or in 
different time periods.
Popkin distinguishes between the risk-sharing 
mechanisms found within peasant communities which moral 
economists frequently lump into one category: "safety-first 
measures." By differentiating between mechanisms to provide 
insurance, welfare and subsidies, Popkin points out that all 
such policies are usually undermined by common-goods 
problems, rampant mistrust and the difficulty of forming any 
form of village-wide consensus. Popkin's analysis of 
Vietnamese peasants illustrates that favors of reciprocity 
lauded by moral economists as "morality" are limited to
57Popkin, The Rational Peasant, p. 46.
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economic equals, and that village leaders only help the less 
fortunate if aid does not negatively affect their own long­
term welfare. For example, Popkin believes the widely used 
scattered-field system is not really a collective strategy 
used to protect the community from starvation if floods or 
fires should destroy crops, but an individual-level strategy 
for avoiding risks. Popkin claims that the self-interested 
motivation behind participation in this type of farming 
demonstrates that "village insurance" and "safety-first" 
schemes extolled by moral economy as provisions for the 
collective good are erroneous.
A further blow to moral economy's vision of peasants' 
commitment to village unity and collective welfare is a 
constant friction that Popkin observes between individual 
and group rationality. By following individual "safety- 
first" measures (like scattered-field farming, Popkin 
argues) each farmer (and thus the village as a whole) is 
ultimately less productive in the long run than he (it) 
would have been if the community had followed an aggregate 
safety-first strategy. That is, while scattered plots 
reduce the chance of any one farmer losing his entire crop, 
they also reduce the maximum yield per farmer. Popkin 
maintains that village-level insurance schemes would be more 
productive and secure than individual-level schemes if and 
only if moral economy assumptions concerning peasant 
behavior were correct. In other words, if peasants had the 
confidence in the charity of their fellow community members
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that moral economists claim they do, there would be no need 
to participate in the scattered field system and produce 
below their maximum possible crop yield. If peasants were 
as altruistic as moral economists believe, they would work 
on non-scattered fields and have faith that if their crops 
were destroyed, the community would provide food and money 
for them to manage until the following season. Popkin 
claims that this was clearly not the case in the Vietnamese 
peasant communities that he observed.
Contrary to Popkin's findings, however, Menchu's 
testimony describes the farming system in her community, 
where each family does farm its own plot in addition to 
helping maintain a separate, communal plot of land that is 
given to community members in times of need, used for 
religious ceremonies or divided up among the community as 
rare surplus. A strictly economic sense of individual 
rationality cannot account for behaviors and beliefs that 
consistently repudiate the notion that '•more” is always 
"better."
In contrast to the euphemisms of brotherly love, 
morality and equality common to the moral economy view of 
peasant behavior, Popkin claims that stratification exists 
in pre-capitalist peasant societies. Evidenced by more 
interest in individual than communal security, the divisions 
between "rich" and "middle" peasants,58 or poor and landless
58According to Popkin, these are peasants owning land and 
farming equipment.
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peasants exist even within the "primitive" societies which 
moral economists tend to label egalitarian. Popkin claims 
that the polarization of wealth within these communities 
does not result solely from capitalist intervention and 
competition in production for marketing purposes; in his 
view, colonialism and capitalism exacerbate but do not 
create economic competition and social stratification within 
peasant communities.
Popkin's second argument against moral economy's 
analysis of peasant societies involves the cultural norms 
which moral economists consider paramount to the peasant 
community. Contrary to moral economy, Popkin believes 
peasant villages are not predominately "moral” communities 
that adhere faithfully to social norms. He maintains that 
peasant villages are social organizations —  not unlike 
those existing in capitalist economies —  that are tainted 
by self-interest, social ranking disputes, desire to improve 
living standards at the expense of others, and the free­
rider problem. Additionally, village leaders and other 
"elites" have a "capitalist" interest in securing exclusive 
profits rather than providing an egalitarian or "level" 
social system.59
59The free-rider phenomenon occurs when an organized group 
seeks a collective good that will be enjoyed by all if achieved. 
An individual may rationalize that he or she will benefit from the 
good even if he or she does not work along with the rest of the 
group to attain it. Individuals participating in this type of 
behavior were referred to by Mancur Olson as "free-riders" in The 
Logic of Collective Action. (New York: Schocken Books, 1968).
For example: Ten co-workers in a real estate firm are told by
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Popkin claims that if moral economy's notion of the 
peasant's altruistic motivation were correct, free-riderism 
would not exist within peasant communities because it would 
be overcome by socialization to communal norms esteeming 
volunteerism.60 In contrast to this ideal, however, Popkin 
found that the twentieth-century Vietnamese peasantry did 
not behave according to this model. In fact, the lack of 
adherence to communal norms in colonial Vietnam provided an 
influential and important opportunity for the Viet Minh both 
to mobilize peasants into their organization and to divide 
them against their fellow countrymen. In other words, by 
helping overcome free-riderism and providing collective 
incentives to peasant villages, the Viet Minh were able to 
co-opt peasant support. Popkin adds that the Catholic, Cao
their supervisor that if they improve their collective sales rate 
by fifteen percent at the end of the year, they will each receive 
twice their usual Christmas bonus. The workers are anxious to earn 
the extra money, and in the following two weeks, seven of the ten 
already have at least four new sales prospects each. The other 
three workers calculate that even if only ten of the new leads turn 
into sales (which is very likely) the group will exceed the fifteen 
percent increase needed to earn the extra Christmas bonus. 
Assuming the bonus is already a "sure thing" the three workers 
slack off on their marketing programs in anticipation of "free­
riding" on the success of their seven co-workers whose diligence 
and struggle increased the collective sales rate.
60 Popkin, The Rational Peasant, p. 50. Michael Taylor has 
argued: "It is worth noting that it is not an implication of the 
moral economy approach that 'there is a community orientation 
whereby the free-rider and leadership problems are easily overcome 
by proper socialization to norms." (Popkin, The Rational Peasant, 
p. 25.) In fact...some villages can overcome free-rider problems, 
not through socialization to norms but through individual 
rationality, just because they are strong communities— but this 
argument is strangely absent from The Rational Peasant. See: M. 
Taylor, "Structure, Culture and Action in the Explanation of Social 
Change," Politics and Society Vol. 17, No. 2 (June 1989): 155.
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Dai and Hoa Hao religions operated in a similar fashion, but 
that the communists were "the only group with the 
sophisticated understanding of national and international 
politics necessary to begin the task of forging a nation by 
incorporating the diverse groups within Vietnam and doing 
battle against French colonialism."61
Again in contrast to the Vietnamese case, we have seen 
that traditional Mayan Indians in Guatemala do esteem 
volunteerism, self-sacrifice and sharing as part of their 
religion and culture62. For these reasons, Guatemalan 
governments have had great difficulty using non-violent 
means to dissolve Indian communities, recruit them into pro­
government political organizations or divide the masses of 
peasants against themselves, as was the case in Vietnam.
The fact that some Mayan Indians have left their communities 
to pursue more modern lifestyles does not disprove my 
argument. As Menchd affirms, individuals who abandon their 
customs or regard them shamefully are those who look 
unfavorably upon their own race and seek to distance 
themselves from it in favor of assimilation (albeit with 
limited possibilities) into ladino culture. Individuals who 
reject their own ethnicity (by refusing to identify 
themselves as Indians, for example) and with it, traditional
61Popkin, The Rational Peasant p. 185.
62In the Guatemalan case, overcoming free-rider problems could 
result form such socialization and/or through individual 
rationality, as Michael Taylor has suggested. See: Taylor,
"Structure, Culture and Action," p. 155.
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culture, lie outside the scope of this argument.
A third difference between Popkin and the moral 
economists involves peasant behavior in a revolutionary 
context. Moral economy states that peasants support 
revolutionaries only when their subsistence (and therefore 
survival) is threatened, whereas Popkin believes that 
peasants living in feudal or subsistence conditions will 
support revolutionaries even without the inspiration of 
dramatic subsistence crises. He rejects moral economy's 
assumption that peasants have fixed views of suitable 
income, will not strive to raise their income above that 
level and are not interested in new forms of consumption.
In his view, peasant are interested in raising and 
diversifying their income and may indeed look to 
revolutionaries to give them such opportunities.63
Popkin states that short-term declines in peasant 
welfare are neither necessary nor sufficient to precipitate
63This point proves complicated in the context of the 
Guatemalan case, because in many respects, both Scott and Popkin 
appear partially correct in their analyses. For example, Menchti 
supports Scott's notion that Indians are not interested in new 
forms of consumption (e.g., clothes, Coca-Cola, white bread, 
mechanical corn grinders and contraceptives.) However, as Popkin 
argues, she also confirms that they are interested in improving 
standards of living. (For example, not having to work on fincas, 
not having to awaken at three in the morning for work, having 
adequate food and shelter and lowering the infant mortality rate, 
for starters.) For the purpose of this paper, the crucial point is 
that Popkin's assertion that peasant struggles are not to restore 
traditional systems (or tradition itself) is not universal. He 
sets the two ideas up as mutually exclusive options, when that is 
not necessarily the case. Menchd has illustrated that traditional 
communities may desire both to preserve tradition and improve 
living conditions.
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peasant uprisings, adding that peasants constantly seek 
individual and collective means to improve their situations. 
For Popkin, therefore, peasant protests are collective 
actions hinging on the abilities of a group or class to 
organize themselves to make demands on the ruling class. 
These movements, he notes, are a reflection of peasants' 
increasing ability to organize and fight for rights and 
privileges to which they have historically been denied.64 
Unlike the moral economists, Popkin believes peasant 
struggles are frequently battles to control markets and 
bureaucracies rather than movements to restore the 
"traditional” systems that provided past security.
A fourth, closely related argument which Popkin makes 
against moral economy involves the land owner-tenant 
relationship. Moral economy commonly compares this 
relationship to that between a "patriarch and a distant 
relative," which Popkin finds too positive a
characterization for what he considers an often exploitative 
and hostile association. He points to the very existence of 
a landless laboring-class within peasant society as evidence 
of the critical weakness of moral economy.65 For Popkin, the
^Popkin, The Rational Peasant, p. 35.
65Popkin is implying moral economy theorizes that landlessness 
among peasants will not exist for individuals but only for entire 
communities. That is, if an individual within a community lost his 
or her parcel of land, the rest of the village would compensate for 
the loss by sharing their own property. Popkin does not address 
the possibility that entire communities may lose their land, be 
forced to separate and attempt to assimilate into new communities 
that may already be short on arable land.
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lack of moral solidarity among the peasantry implies that 
competition exists among them for land and credit from 
patrons. Popkin maintains that competition and discontent 
within peasant communities guarantiees the existence of a 
readily available throng of peasant tenants, willing to help 
their landlord evict a trouble-making or indebted fellow 
resident in return for food, land or money.
Popkin argues that peasants can unite to overthrow 
landlords and increase their collective security, but only 
by changing modes of production, reorganizing local 
institutions to remove monopolies and overcoming the 
linguistic barriers that hinder their success at the 
marketplace. The central government, therefore, is not 
invariably threatening to the peasantry; on the contrary, 
Popkin argues, it can actually be an ally in the process of 
economic growth and transformation.66 Consequently, the 
commercialization of agriculture and development of strong 
central authorities are not consistently detrimental to 
peasant welfare even though they may initially shake-up the 
basic foundation of peasant society. Popkin does not 
suggest that capitalism and colonialism are compassionate, 
but simply that traditional institutions are harsher and 
less efficient than moral economists suggest.
In light of these arguments, it is important to recall
^If that transformation, however, is unwanted, as in the 
Guatemalan Indian case, then the idea of the government being an 
"ally” is nothing less than a misnomer.
48
that in contrast to representatives from the traditional 
communities discussed earlier, Popkin does not consider the 
preservation of culture or custom as "important to peasant 
welfare.” Only if we exclude this factor from 
consideration, therefore, does his conclusion ring true.
That is, the commercialization of agriculture is clearly 
detrimental to peasant society if cultivating the land and 
growing maize is a crucial aspect of Maya-Quiche religion 
and culture. If nothing else, commercialization interferes 
with the goals of preserving traditional practices and 
adhering to ancestral religious customs.
Popkin claims that change introduced by colonialism —  
especially that involving external relations and authority 
penetrating peasant villages —  is a dependent variable that 
can be explained by treating economic and political concerns 
of peasant villages as independent variables. He maintains 
that the distribution of communal resources and patterns of 
self-interest that prevailed in villages before the advent 
of colonial rule were key in determining the local response 
to external regulations and extractions. "Economics shapes 
village institutions,” but should be understood to indicate 
the infrastructure of the economic system —  land titles, 
taxes, methods of conflict resolution and security 
provisions for people and property, not just land, labor,
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water and capital.67
Contrary to moral economy, Popkin believes that peasant 
revolutions and reorganizations in response to outside 
intervention do not indicate a breakdown in values, moral 
bonds or village unity. Instead, he considers these actions 
as typical results of the colonial influences which 
exacerbate existing social stratification by strengthening 
the political advantage of the upper classes and thereby 
inciting peasant protests that eventually snowball into 
support for revolutionary change. Clearly, the notion of 
social stratification within traditional peasant communities 
is not universal. For example, Menchti's testimony 
repeatedly affirms the overly nature of her community and 
its members.
Class benefits from revolutionary action do not 
necessarily mean that there are collective reasons to 
participate in the activity because the benefits of 
collective action appear only in absence of the free-rider 
problem.68 For example, many peasants chose not to 
participate collective action in pre-colonial Vietnam; the 
free-rider syndrome was rampant. Instead of working for
67Here, Popkin is arguing that economics shapes village 
institutions, meaning organizations, their rules and processes. I 
disagree with this concept and contend that if cultural factors are 
weighed into the equation, they will displace economics as the
driving force (or independent variable) in explaining traditional
peasant behavior, both individual and communal. See: Popkin, The
Rational Peasant, p. 182.
68Popkin, The Rational Peasant, p. 252.
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communal benefit to further shared interests, Popkin claims 
that peasants opt to protect and advance exclusively 
individual concerns.69 Like Mancur Olson, Popkin believes 
"unless there is a coercion or some other special device to 
make individuals act for the common good, rational, self- 
interested individuals will not act to achieve their common 
or group interest.1,70
Because he believes peasants are primarily interested 
in financial gain and improving their living conditions, 
Popkin argues that cooperation in peasant society is based 
on task-specific incentives rather than feelings of moral 
obligation or brotherly love. He argues that peasants can 
organize themselves without the intervention of outsiders, 
but that such organization is restricted to cases of exigent 
necessity; that is, for security or survival.71
Once again diverging from Popkin's analysis, the 
earlier discussion and testimony demonstrates that the 
traditional community's ability to organize itself lies 
outside political economy's narrow, crisis-situation 
boundaries, and in fact, often applies to strictly 
ideological matters. I reiterate my central argument:
6901son, The Logic of Collective Action.
70Ibid.
71Popkin notes, "caution and distrust structures the forms of 
cooperation but does not prevent cooperative behavior." He 
describes cooperation among small groups of peasants to stabilize 
production and provide insurance and collective goods absolutely 
essential to survival, like self-defense and irrigation. Please 
see The Rational Peasant, pp. 96-98.
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Popkin's conclusions from the Vietnamese case-study are 
neither universal nor generalizable. The failure of 
Popkin's theory to account for the foretold behaviors 
indicates that we must at least consider another 
alternative, one that has the capacity to include culture 
into the analysis and explanation of rationality.
In sum, then, Popkin's view differs from moral economy 
in its emphasis on individual rather than collective 
decision-making and strategic rather than norm-based 
interaction within the peasantry. Popkin insists his 
position does not necessarily mean peasants are only 
concerned with material gain. Instead, he posits, peasants 
evaluate all possible outcomes associated with specific 
choices and then measure each potential action according to 
a subjective assessment of the probable outcome. In 
economic terms, peasants act according to what they believe 
will maximize their expected utility.
The "rationality" Popkin portrays is not intended to 
suggest that peasants are only self-interested, because he 
claims to believe that at times peasants are concerned about 
the welfare of others, though he never details when those 
times might be. Nevertheless, peasants' primary concerns 
are with self and immediate family.72 When considering the
72Although here, it appears "immediate family" needs 
qualification. If one fails to disregard Popkin's discussion of 
frequently-practiced "infanticide," this assertion appears to 
conflict with his earlier argument that peasant children are 
largely considered expendable commodities that can be replaced when 
finances permit. I assume here he is referring only to "older"
consequences of specific actions with regard to broader 
values and objectives, Popkin concludes that peasants 
more likely than not to act in a "rational and 
[economically] self-interested" manner.73
children (at least eight years old) spouses and parents.
73Popkin, The Rational Peasant, p. 31.
Chapter III;
Complementing rationality with culture
A comprehensive examination and explanation of peasant 
behavior in collective action deviates from Popkin's view in 
two fundamental ways. First, Popkin insists "rationality" 
is a crucial factor in explaining peasant behavior. I agree 
with him on this point. However, in contrast to Popkin's 
argument, I claim that rationality is neither static nor 
monomorphic, but determined — at least in part—  by 
sociocultural forces functioning within a given community.
If we are to judge, cross-culturally, the "rationality" of 
conduct or beliefs without tainting our analysis with 
Western prejudice, we must account for specific influences 
upon the formation of those behaviors and ideas. "By 
abstracting human beings from their social/historical 
condition in order to develop an account of pure rational 
action, the analysis implicitly takes the position that the 
structural conditions for the translation of rationality 
into action are of theoretically secondary interest to the 
problem of characterizing traditional action itself."74 In
74Levine and Wright, "Rationality and Class Struggle," New Left 
Review 123 (1980): 60. While Popkin does not "abstract" Vietnamese 
peasants from their conditions, neither does he include particular 
cultural factors into his analysis of rationality. He treats the
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other words, "pure” rationality cannot exist if we are to
develop a model of rational behavior with the capacity for
transcultural and global utility.
In many Latin American peasant societies traditional
cultural factors help determine what constitutes "rational”
or "irrational" behavior. As Craig Calhoun asserts:
"Choices are still to be made, but they must take social
relationships very closely into account."75 That is, while
traditional culture does not predetermine peasant behavior,
it is, as we have seen, an influential and constraining
influence on individual and group activity. Levine and
Wright argue:
Human beings may be generally rational...and yet 
may be generally thwarted from fully acting on the 
basis of that rationality because of social 
constraints, relations of domination, 
organizational incapacities for collective 
struggle and so on. The abstracted, ahistorical 
account of rationality may provide an essential 
element in the philosophical critique of those 
constraints, but it does not provide a basis for 
explaining the real determinations and 
contradictions of those constraints.76
Second, in response to the moral economy view of
peasant culture, which claims that peasants defend
Vietnamese peasant as a generic "person type" whose behavior (or 
rationality) is duplicated in other, different circumstances. It 
is this universalization of peasant motivation and behavior to 
which I am reacting. When considering peasant rationality, we must 
account for specific social and historical factors in order to 
avoid the pitfall of unjustified cultural universalism.
75Calhoun, "Radicalism of Tradition," p. 147.
76Levine and Wright, "Rationality and Class Struggle," p. 60. 
(My emphasis.)
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traditional institutions because they provide reliable means 
of subsistence, Popkin contends that peasants are constantly 
looking to improve their standards of living, often at the 
expense of fellow community members. He does not consider 
the possibility that a peasant community may cling to 
traditional institutions for the sake of tradition itself, 
as a means to protect and preserve its imperiled culture and 
autonomy. Preserving cultural traditions is synonymous with 
survival; theoretically, if the community's distinctive 
culture, traditions and institutions disappear, Menchu's 
people cease to exist. In other words, life without 
cultural identity is death. While rationality is indeed 
individually determined, that rational behavior can be 
employed to obtain and protect collective objectives that 
cannot be reduced to individually beneficial economic 
interests.
This paper has examined collective consciousness and 
individual sacrifice for the sake of community within two 
Central American peasant societies —  the Mayan Indians 
living in the Altiplano of Guatemala and the Miskito Indians 
on the Nicaraguan Atlantic Coast. I believe that these 
cases are not "exceptions to the rule" of self-interested 
rational behavior —  as Popkin would likely encourage us to 
believe —  but indications of an intrinsic sense of 
community and collective interest that is irreducible to the 
individual level. In other words, as Menchu has informed 
us, individual rationality is at times not exercised for
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individual benefit (indeed, it can be contrary to individual
interest) but to safeguard a deeply personalized collective
identity. A Miskito patriot explains:
In the Indian villages on the Atlantic Coast of 
Nicaragua we have our own way of living. We like 
to live in freedom. The people of Awastara, the 
village where I was born, like to live and think 
independently. Since the ancient days, we Miskito 
Indians have possessed great strength and wisdom, 
which have served to preserve and protect our 
traditions, our lives and our dignity as a 
nation.... Our spiritual family embraces all 
Indians who have tread upon this earth and all who 
will make life's journey in a future time.... Now 
in the year 1987, I, Rafaga, am demanding the 
restoration of our Miskito Indian rights. The 
voices of all my ancestors and the voices of all 
future generations of Miskito come now to mingle 
with my own as our words ride together on a gust 
of wind...exploding of fiery evidence into the 
ears of our world.
Likewise, in her personal testimony, Menchu tells of
several occasions of non self-interested behavior which
could not be explained by Popkin's account of economic
rationality. For example, she describes the birth custom
within the community:
The birth of a new member is very significant for 
the community, as it belongs to the community not 
just to the parents, and that's why three 
couples...must be there to receive it....[After 
the birth] the community takes over all the 
household expenses for...eight days and the family
spends nothing  The tying of hands at birth
symbolizes...that no one should accumulate things 
that the rest of the community does not have and 
he must know how to share, to have open hands.78
^Reynaldo Reyes and J.K. Wilson, Rafaga. the Life Storv of a 
Nicaraguan Miskito Comandante (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1992), p. 3.
78Menchd, An Indian Woman in Guatemala, pp. 11, 13, 15.
Here, both the actions of the community (giving money) and
the symbolism of the custom (tying of hands) give credence
to the central claim of this argument: the existence of
norm-enforced, non self-interested behavior.
Another illustration of non self-interested behavior
within the Maya-Quiche community unfolds in Menchu's
description of her childhood work life. One particular
season, while living on a landowner's farm with her family
MenchO's younger brother, Nicholas, starved to death. The
ladino landowner forced them to leave without compensation
because they had missed a day's work to bury the child.
Menchd recounts the situation:
We didn't know our whereabouts, we didn't know 
where we were or anything. My mother didn't even 
know the name of the town we were in. But we knew 
we had to leave so my mother began getting our 
things together. So our neighbors said: 'We'll go 
with you even though it means losing everything we 
worked for too.' One of them lent my mother some 
money to pay for the burial since she'd been at 
the finca about for four months and had saved a 
little money....We arrived back at our house in 
the AZtiplano....My father didn't know his son had 
died, nor did my other brothers and sisters 
because they were working on other fincas.
Fifteen days later, they all arrived home to be 
greeted by the news that the little boy had died 
and that we owed a lot of money. My father and 
brothers and sisters had been earning in other 
fincas and had enough money to settle with our 
neighbor. The neighbor also gave what he felt he 
should to the dead child. That's how they helped 
us— the community, everyone— once we'd got home.79
Both the Miskito and Maya-Quiche cases reveal that part of
the collective identity which both communities strive to
79Ibid, pp. 40-41.
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protect includes a shrinking cultural base, endangered 
subsistence and a disappearing way of life. These peoples 
are literally in danger of extinction due to both atrocious 
living conditions, like the malnutrition Menchti. mentions 
repeatedly in her narration, and organized campaigns to 
assimilate, integrate or destroy the indigenous populations.
Recall the suggestion of Ian Lustik with which I began 
this essay: there is "a pre-existing sense of community 
among participants in collective revolutionary action that 
makes it possible for organizers to appeal the rationality 
of their constituents as basis for participation.”80 In the 
context of this paper, I maintain that (1) common culture 
and (2) collective consciousness are independent variables 
leading to the dependent variable (3) facilitated collective 
action. While I seek not to "prove” Calhoun's thesis 
concerning mobilization, I do believe that common cultural 
and traditional constraints combine with a collective 
consciousness that transcends individual economic interests 
combine to give these peasant groups the "pre-existing sense 
of community" to which Lustik refers. I do not believe this 
deduction is unconditionally true, but hinges on specific 
cultural and traditional influences functioning within the 
given community. That is, as Levine and Wright have 
indicated, rational behavior cannot be understood or 
explained in abstraction from its context, but only by
80Lustik, "Writing the Intifada," p. 589.
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taking social, historical and cultural factors into account.
Craig Calhoun's explanation of peasant rationality and
mobilization has provided four specific, yet generalizable
factors to explain why traditional communities are mobilized
into collective action more readily than non-traditional
communities. Expanding upon these points without diving
into the empirical problem of confirming his thesis, I
conclude that: (1) specific cultural forces and (2) a sense
of collective identity or group consciousness were (and are)
at work in facilitating Mayan and Miskito mobilization into
rebellious and even revolutionary activity.
Calhoun sets out the following definition of a
traditional community:
Community is...a central medium for transmitting 
tradition and a large part of what tradition is 
about...a complex variable measuring the extent to 
which people are knit together by direct social 
relationships81.... [Relationships may be 
stronger or weaker, networks may be knit more or 
less densely and systematically together, and a 
population may be more or less able to run its own 
affairs without outside intervention. Community 
constrains the range of free choice of individuals 
by committing them to specific, long-term 
relationships. Such communities make it possible 
for members to act with considerable certainty as 
to what their fellows will do.... [Bjecause their 
activity is kept largely within the grounds of 
established relationships, members of communities 
are able constantly to reproduce a traditional
81Calhoun adds that these relationships include both intimate 
and "secondary" associations. "They do not include those 
constructed through the mediation of bureaucracy or those 
transcending communications technology. Relationships which lack 
personal recognition and face-to-face constitution [are indirect.]" 
Please see Calhoun, "New Information Technology, Large Scale Social 
Integration and the Local Community," Urban Affairs Quarterly 22 
(1986) pp. 329-49.
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culture without introducing a wide variety of
interpretation.82
Thus, because they engender a collective identity (or 
collective consciousness, as I have tried to illustrate) 
traditional communities such as the Mayan and Miskito 
Indians engender collective, often non-economic interests 
which cannot be fulfilled at an individual level. For 
example, in accordance with the testimony of Menchti, the 
Mayan Indians living throughout Guatemala and Chiapas,
Mexico have fought for the past several decades for their 
cultural rights. Regardless of what that term boils down 
to, it follows that these "cultural rights" are sought for 
an entire group rather than any one individual. No 
individual can protect, preserve —  and certainly not 
propagate —  an entire culture by working independently.
Conceivably, most organized groups are composed of 
individuals who share at least one, and often many common 
interests. Unlike such "interest groups" (political 
parties, unions, university student bodies) whose members 
often have differing social backgrounds and different 
paramount goals, the traditional community can benefit from 
members' prior associations or bonds as components of one 
socioeconomic, political, linguistic and cultural body. Not 
only do they share a common culture, but a common autonomous 
culture that is not and cannot be duplicated outside of its
82Calhoun, "The Radicalism of Tradition," pp. 148-49.
Idem. , "Community: Toward a Variable Conceptualization for 
Comparative Research," Social History 5 (1980) pp. 105-129.
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existing social boundaries.
Conclusion
By considering the Mayan and Miskito Indians of Central 
America, I have illustrated that Samuel Popkin's argument 
for "political economy" in The Rational Peasant is flawed by 
its failure to consider culture in the study and theorizing 
of rational behavior. In criticizing the overly optimistic 
view of moral economists advanced in James C. Scott's The 
Moral Economy of the Peasant. Popkin appears to overstate 
his case in favor of an economically oriented peasantry 
which relies little (or not at all) on its communal 
traditions, norms or culture as bases for decision-making or 
determining rational behavior. By omitting these crucial 
factors and taking no account of specific cultural forces 
(or even general ones, for that matter) functioning within a 
given peasant community, Popkin implicitly embraces a 
cultural universalism that is clearly unsuitable for 
examining the Indian communities I have addressed in this 
paper.
An inquiry into the beliefs, actions and attitudes of 
Maya-Quiche and Miskito Indians indicates that Popkin's 
political economy falls short of providing an appropriate 
analytical framework for understanding these peoples.
Scott's moral economy, in fact, appears a great deal more
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appropriate. It seems clear that political and moral
economy are not necessarily mutually exclusive schools of
thought, but instead, can be complements in the task of
explaining peasant behavior. Pitting one school against the
other —  or rationality against tradition —  does little to
advance our appreciation and understanding of peoples unlike
ourselves. Michael Taylor explains:
From reading Samuel Popkin's attack in The 
Rational Peasant on Scott/s Moral Economy of the 
Peasant, one might come away believing (as Popkin 
seems to believe) that these two approaches are 
incompatible with each other, that a peasant with 
a "moral economy" could not also be a rational 
peasant. This would be mistaken. There is in 
fact nothing in Scott's arguments that cannot be 
integrated into [anl... explanatory framework [of 
rational behavior.]®3
As mentioned in the outset of this investigation, however, 
merely converging moral and political economy is not 
sufficient. The evidence examined in this essay 
substantiates the claim that we also must contemplate the 
third, "culturally inclusive" alternative which I have 
advanced. Omitting culture from considerations of rational 
behavior provides tacit support for cultural universalism. 
Such an exclusion must be avoided if we are to develop non­
biased theories of rational choice.
To recapitulate the argument, I claim the following: 
Here is this evidence (Menchti's testimony et. al.): If it is 
valid —  a question beyond the scope of this paper —  than 
existing moral and political economy frameworks cannot
83Taylor, "Structure, Culture and Action," pp. 118-19.
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handle it. Therefore, we must also consider alternative 
approaches to rationality which can account for culture, and 
test them empirically in further investigation.
While the task of reconciling culture with the concept 
of rationality is fundamentally more complicated than 
Popkin's strictly economic analysis, is not theoretically 
impossible. Reiterating Levine and Wright, we need simply 
to consider rationality as "endogenous" to a given 
sociocultural system. The most "narrow” conclusion, then, 
is that a culturally aware inquiry into peasant behaviors 
can ultimately be advantageous to many disciplines of social 
science, beginning with anthropology, sociology and 
political science. In a more cosmopolitan sense, we human 
beings could do worse than to strive for cultural 
sensitivity and reciprocal understanding on the ever- 
shrinking planet which we all call home.
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